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FINANCIAL DEEPENING FOR AGRICULTURE IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
Abstract 
This paper has four parts. The first one examines the importance of 
financial deepening in economic development. The second one describes 
the process of financial deepening in Central America and identifies 
its deficiencies. The third one explores the impact of the recent 
economic crisis on the real size and performance of the Central Ameri-
can financial systems. The fourth one briefly analyzes the role of 
financial services in agricultural development as well as the dif-
ficulties of supplying these services to the rural population. Finally, 
the paper explores the differential impact of the crisis on the pro-
vision of financial services for agriculture. 
After two decades of substantial financial deepening, with the crisis 
the real value of deposits mobilized and loans outstanding dramatically 
declined and the favorable trends were reversed. The private sector was 
"crowded out" from loan portfolios. Portfolio concentration and de-
fault increased. The financial system became less of an intermediary 
between private savers and investors and more of a fiscal instrument to 
tax resources away from savers. Transaction costs increased, and the 
urban bias of financial development augmented. The share of agricultural 
loans in total credit declined; the share of small farmers declined even 
further. The concept of the iron law of interest-rate restrictions is 
used to explain these changes in portfolio composition after financial 
repression increased. 
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The Importance of Financial Deepening 
Until recently, the role of the financial system and the nature of its 
contributions to economic growth in the less developed countries (LDCs) 
had received little attention. Although Schumpeter had recognized the 
role of finance in the unlocking of resources for innovation, invest-
ment, and growth, this role was excluded from the main traditions of 
theory and practice with respect to the LDCs. Following the seminal 
work of Shaw and McKinnon, however, it has become increasingly accepted 
that the financial sector does matter in economic development. 
Shaw insisted in looking at the financial system as just another pro-
ductive sector, with its industries, markets, prices, institutions, and 
policies. Financial firms combine inputs, primarily human, in order to 
produce a complex set of financial services, used mostly as intermediate 
inputs into other production processes. · These financial services are 
not costless, however. Supplying them is expensive in resources, so 
their provision is justified only if they increase aggregate productivi-
ty sufficiently to compensate for their opportunity cost. 
The contributions of the financial sector to economic growth are as-
sociated with the provision of at least four types of services (Long). 
The most basic of these services is the provision of a universally ac-
cepted medium of exchange, which reduces the cost of conducting transac-
tions in commodity and factor markets, increasing the flow of trade and 
enlarging market size, and thus improving the productivity of resources 
through specialization and the division of labor, greater competition, 
and the exploitation of modern technologies and of economies of scale. 
This "monetization" of the economy releases resources from the search 
and bargain processes associated with barter and, through greater market 
integration, increases the efficiency of resource allocation. 
Second, the financial system provides services of intermediation be-
tween surplus (savings) and deficit (investment) units, thus enhancing 
the accumulation of capital and improving its allocation. Surplus units 
are those with abundant resources of their own, as compared to their in-
ternal investment opportunities. They earn low marginal rates of return 
on their assets, when compared to deficit units. These, in turn, pos-
sess few resources, relative to opportunities, and could earn relatively 
high marginal rates of return, if they had access to the resources 
needed to take advantage of those opportunities. 
In the absence of finance, producers are condemned to take advantage 
of their opportunities only to the extent allowed by their own endowment 
of resources, while in other cases are forced to invest them poorly. 
There is no reason to expect that those with the capacity to save are 
necessarily those with the best investment opportunities. Through the 
provision of intermediation services, the financial system contributes 
to the elimination of inferior uses of resources and, at the same time, 
facilitates better alternative uses of them. This is accomplished when 
the financial system offers wealthholders new assets (e.g. bank deposits) 
that are more attractive forms of holding wealth than the unprofitable 
uses thus eliminated. The intermediary, in turn, transfers claims on 
resources to others with better opportunities. From this perspective, 
the financial system offers valuable services not only to borrowers, but 
also to depositors. 
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Market fragmentation, and the small size of transactions, high costs 
of information, and uncertainty and risks characteristic of rural econo-
mies cause high transaction costs in the financial markets of LDCs. As 
a result, returns to savers are low, the total cost of funds to borrow-
ers is high, the size of financial markets is small, and the volume of 
funds channeled and the variety of financial services provided are lim-
ited. In turn, market fragmentation and high transaction costs imply a 
large dispersion in marginal rates of return accross the economy, sig-
naling unexploited opportunities for improved resource allocation. Fi-
nancial progress results from the reduction of risks and transaction 
costs, through the exploitation of economies of scale and of scope, 
professional portfolio management, risk-reducing diversification, the 
accumulation of information, and the establishment of bank-customer 
relationships. Borrowing and lending costs cannot be reduced by decree 
(e.g. usury laws). Rather, interest-rate restrictions and other forms 
of regulation usually increase the level of the transaction costs im-
posed on actual and potential market participants (Gonzalez-Vega). 
Third, the financial system provides reserve-management services. 
Most economic units accumulate stores of value for emergencies or to 
take advantage of future investment opportunities. The financial sys-
tem may reduce the costs and risks of these precautionary and specula-
tive reserves while, through the provision of "unused lines of credit," 
it reduces the desired stock of reserves, thus releasing resources for 
productive purposes. Finally, the financial system provides services of 
fiscal support for the public sector. This is an important contribution, 
in view of the weakness of tax structures and securities markets in LDCs. 
The financial sector also contributes to foreign-exchange management. 
Economic development both depends on and contributes to the growth and 
diversification of the financial system. Financial deepening matters to 
the extent to which it provides incentives for savings and investment, 
it encourages savers to hold a larger proportion of their wealth in the 
form of domestic financial assets (rather than unproductive inflation 
hedges, foreign assets, and other money substitutes), and it channels 
resources toward better alternative uses. The extent to which these ser-
vices are provided depends on the real size of the financial system and 
on the efficiency of its performance, as measured by the magnitude and 
dispersion of the transaction costs imposed on all market participants. 
Financial Deepening in Central America 
During the 1960s and most of the 1970s, the Central American countries 
experienced a steady and significan~ process of financial deepening. 
This process was reflected by the establishment of numerous financial 
institutions, the provision of a wider range of financial services, in-
creasing competition, the geographical expansion of the branch network, 
and the growth of deposits mobilized and of credit volumes in real terms. 
By 1961 the financial system of the Central American countries was still 
comparatively small, as reflected by the ratio of the money supply (in 
the broad sense of currency plus demand, savings, and term deposits) 
with respect to the GDP of only 15%. This resulted from comparatively 
low incomes, small domestic markets, and large subsistence sectors. 
This ratio had increased to 29% by 1976, a comparatively high levels for 
LDCs, ranging from 24% for Guatemala to 41% for Costa Rica. Financial 
deepening was made possibl~ by vigorous output growth, exchange-rate 
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stability, and the absence of inflation. This, in turn, resulted from 
the openness of these economies and from cautious fiscal, credit, and 
mane ta ry pol ic ie s tar g e t.ed to ma in tain a fixed exchange rate. 
Despite financial deepening, as measured by the ratios of financial 
magnitudes with respect to the GDP, the Central American economies con-
tinued to rely heavily on foreign savings for the financing of domestic 
investment. Domestic financial markets remained highly fragmented and 
of mostly an urban character. Only a small proportion of the total po-
pulation has had access to the new financial services offered, particu-
larly in the rural areas. Less than 20% of all agricultural producers 
have had access to institutional loans. The loan portfolios of formal 
lenders have shown much concentration: among those priviledged enough to 
have access to loans, few have captured the largest proportion of the 
funds disbursed. In the case of agricultural loans, about 10% of the 
number of borrowers have received 85% of the amounts outstanding. High 
transaction costs have been imposed on financial-market ·participants, so 
high that these costs have excluded large segments of the Central Ameri-
can population from access to formal finance. Government intervention, 
in the form of interest-rate restrictions, reserve requirements, redis-
counting schemes, selective credit allocations, and restrictions to entry 
have accentuated market fragmentation and augmented transaction costs. 
These deficiencies have been worsened by the recent economic crisis. 
Impact of the Economic Crisis on the Financial System 
The Central American countries are in the midst of an acute economic 
crisis, characterized by stagnant or contracting outputs, declining ex-
ports and imports, growing unemployment, large public-sector deficits 
and public external debts, accelerating inflation, and the explicit or 
implicit devaluation of their currencies. The magnitude and evolution 
of the crisis have responded to a combination of long-term trends and of 
unfavorable short-term circumstances, both abroad and at home. The 
long-term, structural determinants of the crisis reflect a contradiction 
between the region's most basic characteristics (small market size, very 
open, rural, labor-abundant economies) and some of the features of the 
protectionist strategy of import-substitution industrialization adopted 
in the late 1950s. High costs and distortions have resulted from the 
penalization of agriculture and of exports. The crisis has also re-
flected an increasing role of the public sector in production, while its 
short-term causes have included sizable external shocks and incorrect 
domestic policies adopted in response to these shocks, which have in-
cluded sharp swings in international terms-of-trade, changes in the 
terms and conditions of international financial flows, and regional 
turmoil. Recovery will require drastic policy changes. 
The Central American financial syst1!ms have suffered significantly 
with the crisis. There h~s been a fi·1cal reason for this. When the 
contraction of real incomes in the early 1980s reduced the rate of 
growth of government-revenue collecti0n, with expenditures expanding 
rapidly, for a while the authorities financed their budget deficits by 
placing their debt abroad. EventualJy, however, they were forced to 
finance the growing deficits with d11mestic credit, with two consequences. 
Too rapid an expansion of domestic credit led to the loss of interna-
tional monetary reserves, accelerai.ing inflation, and eventual devalua-
tion. Second, the private sector .. 1as been "crowded out" of bank loan 
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portfolios. Before the 1970s, less than 20% of domestic credit was al-
located to the public sector; in the early 1980s this proportion had 
increased to over 45%. Public-sector credit represented almost 70% of 
the value of domestic deposits mobilized. As a proportion of the GDP, 
credit for this sector increased from 3% in 1961 to 22% in 1982. In 
summary, fiscal deficits have been financed with losses of international 
reserves, increasing borrowing abroad, and finally with the inflation 
tax, thus accentuating financial repression. 
Inflation and devaluation expectations, resulting in negative interest 
rates, in real terms, have led to capital flight and currency substitu-
tion. Inflation has also eroded the real value of credit portfolios and 
of domestic deposits. All financial magnitudes have declined, when 
measured in real terms, and as a proportion of the GDP. First, during 
most of the 1970s the money supply of these countries, in a broad sense, 
steadily increased. In real terms, the average annual rates of growth 
of the money supply for 1970-77 were 9.7% (Guatemala), 9.2% (El Salvador), 
10.1% (Honduras), and 16.7% (Costa Rica). For 1978-82 these rates became 
negative in three countries: - 5.6% (El Salvador), - 1.1% (Honduras), and 
- 4.5% (Costa Rica), and declined to 0.3% in Guatemala. Second, in view 
of this less dynamic resource mobilization, domestic credit has also 
declined, especially the share allocated to the private sector. For 
1970-77, the average annual rates of growth of credit for the private 
sector had been 6.8% (El Salvador), 9.8% (Honduras), and 11.5% (Costa 
Rica). For 1978-82 these rates became negative: - 7.9% (El Salvador), 
- 1.8% (Honduras), and - 16.5% (Costa Rica). This contraction in the 
real value of the flows of domestic credit coincided with a curtailment 
of the flows of foreign credit and with a reduction in the real value of 
the working capital of firms. 
Important changes have taken place with respect to the extent to which 
the Central American financial systems have been providing their ser-
vices. The reduced comparative advantage of domestic currencies in 
supplying monetary services has resulted in currency substitution, thus 
limiting the ability of the financial system to provide other services. 
Domestic financial assets have become poor stores of value for precau-
tionary and speculative purposes, forcing savers to search for unpro-
ductive inflation hedges. An excessive emphasis has been placed on the 
fiscal-support function. The domestic financial system has become much 
less of an intermediary between private savers and investors, and more 
of a fiscal instrument, to tax resources away from wealthholders in 
order to finance public-sector expenditures. This abuse of the fiscal 
function has reduced the ability of the financial system to promote 
recovery and growth. Intermediation, however, is particularly import-
ant during periods of adjustment, wht~n resources must be reallocated. 
Financial Services for Agriculture 
Market fragmentation and the dispersion of marginal rates of return are 
greater in the rural areas of LDCs, Euggesting a crucial role for fi-
nancial deepening. High transaction costs and inadequate regulation, 
however, have contributed to the urbi1n bias of financial development. 
Borrowing and lending costs are high in view of the heterogeneity of 
rural populations, the lack of expf.rience of urban-based institutions, 
and high risks. Producer diversitf increases the dispersion of the 
distributions of the probability uf default and increases the cost of 
-~ 
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information. The geographic dispersion of clients, absence of an ade-
quate infrastructure, and the distance from bank branches also increase 
the costs of bringing borrowers and lenders together. Illiteracy, lack 
of banking experience, and loan targeting increase the costs of process-
ing loans. The substantial influence of exogenous factors on yields, 
small size, and limited opportunities for diversification increase risk. 
Lack of legal tenure and of mortgageable assets reduces access to loans. 
Interest-rate policies that limit revenue generation, combined with high 
lending costs, further reduce the willingness of formal lenders to pene-
trate the countryside. These transaction costs have been very high in 
Central America, excluding most of the rural population from access to 
financial services. 
The agrarian nature of the Central American countries, however, has 
been reflected by the shares of agricultural loans in credit portfolios. 
In 1961 these shares were 21% in Honduras, 26% in El Salvador, 48% in 
Guatemala, 56% in Costa Rica, and 63% in Nicaragua. The unusually high 
shares in the last two countries responded to specific policies to ex-
pand agricultural credit services. During the 1960s, this share in-
creased in Honduras and declined in Guatemala. By 1970, it was 27% in 
El Salvador, 32% in Honduras, 36% in Guatemala, 57% in Costa Rica, and 
60% in Nicaragua. By 1980, the share of agricultural loans in total 
credit had declined in all countries but El Salvador, when these shares 
were 22% in Guatemala, 27% in Honduras, 29% in El Salvador, 43% in Costa 
Rica, and 54% in Nicaragua. In part, these changes in the relative im-
portance of agricultural credit have reflected the structural transform-
ation experienced by these economies during the past two decades. How-
ever, during the most recent years, they have also reflected the impact 
of increased financial repression, as reflected by declining ratios of 
agricultural credit flows with respect to the value of the agricultural 
output. 
The contraction of the financial systems of the Central American coun-
tries has been accompanied by important changes in the composition of 
credit portfolios. As indicated, the private sector has been "crowded 
out" from these portfolios, while the public sector has significantly 
enlarged its share. The contraction has been particularly dramatic in 
the case of the Nationalized Banking System of Costa Rica (Cespedes et 
al). In real terms, by 1982 total domestic credit represented only 40% 
of its 1978 value. Credit for the private sector represented only 36% 
of its former level. Even credit for the public sector had declined in 
real value, to 41% of its 1980 level by 1982. Too rapid an expansion 
of domestic credit, in nominal termn, had eventually resulted in a sharp 
contraction of credit volumes, in real terms. In the race between nomi-
nal credit volumes and inflation, the latter was the easy winner. 
The components of the loan portfolio, by sector of use of the loans 
granted, have experienced the contraction to a different degree. The 
share of productive sectors, including agriculture, has contracted at 
the expense of the share of real estate, commerce, and other speculative 
activities. In Costa Rica, the real value of credit outstanding for 
crops in 1982 represented 44% of its 1978 level, while the real value 
of credit for livestock representeo 34% of its former level. In Hondu-
ras, where the contraction has been less dramatic, by 1982 the total 
loan portfolio represented 69% of its 1978 value, while the agricultural 
portfolio amounted to 61% of its former value. The 1982 value of loans 
for crops was 55% and the value o1 livestock credit was 90% of the 
1978 levels. 
. . 
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By the turn of the decade, not only was the real size of the Central 
American banking systems shrinking, but the number of bank clients was 
declining, loan portfolios were showing an increasing concentration in 
favor of a smaller number of larger borrowers, and several financial 
institutions were experiencing severe default problems. In Honduras, 
the share of agricultural loans in total credit had declined to 24% in 
1981 from 30% in 1976. In Costa Rica, the share of small farmers in 
agricultural credit flows had declined from 20% to 10%. Given the fun-
gibility of funds, a greater proportion of agricultural loans were being 
diverted toward other sectors of economic activity. The provision of 
financial services for agriculture had suffered a more than propor-
tional blow from the crisis; small farmers had suffered even more. 
The iron law of interest-rate restrictions may be used to explain 
these changes in portfolio composition that result from increased fi-
nancial repression (Gonzalez-Vega). Inflation and the contraction of 
the financial system in real terms have accentuated the impact of in-
terest-rate limitations. Preferred borrowers have maintained the real 
value of their loans and, therefore, have increased their participation 
in credit portfolios. Non-preferred, marginal clients have seen the 
real size of their loans shrink in the face of inflation and their port-
folio shares reduced. Many have been excluded from further access to 
formal credit. Others have seen borrowing costs increase, as new res-
trictions and requirements have been imposed. With the economic crisis, 
the financial systems of Central America have substantially reduced the 
amount and quality of financial services provided to agricultural pro-
ducers. 
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